Abstract. Security of quantum key distribution against sophisticated attacks is among the most important issues in quantum information theory. In this work we prove security against a very important class of attacks called collective attacks (under a compatible noise model) which use quantum memories and gates, and which are directed against the final key. This work was crucial for a full proof of security (against the joint attack) recently obtained by Biham, Boyer, Boykin, Mor, and Roychowdhury [1].
Using this setting, many physicists and computer scientists have tried to prove the security of various quantum key distribution schemes in the last decade. The conventional measure of security is the information Eve can obtain on the final key, and a security proof usually calculates (or puts bounds on) this information. Many particular attacks have been analyzed, such as the intercept-resend attacks and the individual particle attacks, for which there is a clear intuition that classical privacy amplification provides the desired security. However, these attacks are special cases which simplify the security analysis considerably. Quantum mechanics allows much stronger attacks which use quantum gates and quantum memory and are directed against the final key. The strongest (most general) attacks allowed by quantum mechanics are called joint attacks. Such attacks are beyond current technology, but, obviously, a cryptosystem is not absolutely secure if some future technology could break it. Thus, proving security against any attack allowed by the rules of physics is a vital step.
In this paper we complete the work started in [8] [9] [10] to conclude that, under a compatible error model, the four-state scheme [3] for quantum key distribution is secure against any collective attack, an important subclass of the joint attacks. The first version of our paper appeared in the public domain 6 in 1998 but has not yet been published. Our result is an important step on the route to proving the security of quantum key distribution against joint attacks. It can lead to such a proof if one generalizes this work, or if one succeeds in proving an older conjecture [9] , namely, that collective attacks are the strongest subclass of the joint attacks (meaning that Eve can obtain the largest amount of mutual information if she uses a collective attack, and not if she uses any other joint attack).
Recently, by exploiting and generalizing the techniques presented here, and by expanding the analysis further, Biham et al. [1] succeeded in proving the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks on the channel, the joint attacks: the general attack is described in [1] as a generalization of the attack on a bit (equation (7)) to an attack of a string, and the proof of security is based on a generalization of the purification of Bob's bit (equation (10) ) to a purification of Bob's string, on the use of the theorems proven here, and many additional steps required to deal with the much more complex attack. Note that the conjecture of [9] cited above is still an open problem.
Other independent proofs of the security against joint attacks were also derived prior to the proof of Biham et al. [11] , [12] and shortly after [13] based on various different methods, 7 hence this old-standing important problem of the security is now considered solved. However, it is important to have several approaches since (a) practical quantum key distribution is not yet proven secure [7] , (b) in cryptography, it is not unheard of that proofs of security are found wrong or incomplete once better understanding is obtained (though this statement probably does not apply to any of the proposed proofs in the case of quantum key distribution), and (c) different proofs are sometimes based upon different assumptions, hence often lead to different results (especially when connected to various practical considerations, such as multiphoton states and high channel losses).
Description of the Protocol.
In the four-state scheme of Bennett and Brassard [3] the sender (Alice) sends to the receiver (Bob) a classical string x of length n using a quantum channel, by sending qubits. She sends either |0 z or |0 x = (|0 z + |1 z )/ √ 2 to encode a bit value 0, or she sends either |1 z or |1 x = (|0 z − |1 z )/ √ 2 to encode a bit value 1. Each classical bit is chosen randomly, and the basis (x or z) for encoding each classical bit using a qubit is also chosen randomly. Alice and Bob are also connected by a classical channel which is insecure against eavesdropping (it is assumed public) but unjammable (cannot be tampered with). At a later stage, after Bob has received the particles, Alice tells Bob through the classical, public channel which basis (x or z) she used for each qubit. If Bob has used the same basis for his measurement they keep the bit, otherwise they discard it. The resulting n -bit string x is known as the sifted key. If no errors and no eavesdropping occurred, then Alice's string x A is identical to Bob's string x B .
However, due to imperfections in the creation, transmission, and measurement of qubits transmission errors will occur. Therefore Alice and Bob agree in advance on some error rate threshold p allowed . Once Alice and Bob share the sifted key (i.e. two almost identical strings x A and x B ) they estimate the error rate using a random subset of n test bits. If the error rate p test on the test-bits is less than the pre-agreed threshold p allowed , then the test succeeds and Alice and Bob choose n bits from the remaining bits (hence, n ≤ n − n test ) to be the "information bits." These n-bit information strings in Alice's and Bob's hands are denoted respectively x A and x B . The error-rate on the information bits (the value |x A ⊕ x B |/n) is promised to be similar to the error-rate on the test bits due to a law of large numbers which is applicable due to the random sampling of the test bits.
Once the test is passed, the last step is to obtain a final key of length m from these n bits by performing error correction and privacy amplification. We describe a particular way to perform this (alternative ways exist, but are harder to analyze): Alice and Bob choose parities of r substrings for error correction and parities of m substrings for privacy amplification. The parity of each of the r error-correction substrings is announced in order to correct x B , and the parities of the m privacy amplification substrings are kept secret, and used as the final key.
In the most general ("joint") attack, the eavesdropper, Eve, can do whatever she likes (the most general unitary transformation using an ancilla) to the qubits, and delay her measurement of the (extremely big) ancilla until receiving all classical data. In the collective attack, each of Alice's qubits is attacked via a separate ancilla and all ancillas are finally measured collectively. The first hints that such collective measurements will not destroy the security obtained by privacy amplification were provided in [8] . The first complete examples (which contain privacy amplification and error correction) were provided in [14] and [9] (Mayers work was based on an earlier work of Yao).
In this paper we restrict ourself to "collective" attacks [9] , [10] , where each qubit is attached to a separate probe, unentangled to any other probe. The measurement is delayed until after all the classical data is obtained, and is performed collectively on all probes. There are good reasons [9] , [10] to believe that collective attacks are the strongest joint attacks (when n is large): Eve has no knowledge regarding which are the relevant qubits at the time she performs the unitary transformation, and the probability of performing the transformation on relevant qubits alone is exponentially small. A transformation done on relevant and irrelevant qubits together seems to cause noise without providing useful information to Eve. Furthermore, no particular joint attack has been shown to be stronger than collective attacks (in terms of Eve's information on the final key). It may well be that the symmetric collective attack of [10] , which uses two-dimensional probes, is the strongest joint attack in terms of the amount of information it gives to the eavesdropper.
In a collective attack, when Alice sends x to Bob, each qubit gets entangled with a separate probe of Eve. So the global state of the Eve-Bob system is ρ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ n where each ρ i is a density operator on the space H E i ⊗ H B i and where the space H E i and the two-dimensional space H B i belong respectively to Eve and Bob. To simplify the derivation of the proof of security, and to make this paper clear and a bit less technical, we leave the proofs of the four theorems provided here to the Appendix. We consider m = 1 in the first sections and leave the general case of m bits to the last sections of this paper.
Bounds on Information.
We present some notations from information theory. Let B and X be random variables (describing the input and output of a channel). When the context is clear we write
The mutual information between the input and the output probability distributions,
, tells us the average increase of knowledge about the input when the output is known.
Let the entropy function
(1− p). For a binary input B with equal input probabilities,
where
(1 − p). Distinguishing the input when the output is given, is then equivalent to distinguishing the two probability distributions p 0 (x) and p 1 (x). All the probability distributions in the expression of the mutual information can be calculated from p 0 (x), p 1 (x) (since the input probabilities
are also known):
Therefore, we can define another function SD, Shannon Distinguishability,
(restricted to binary input with equal probabilities), which has the same values as the mutual information, but is a function of the two probability distributions p 0 (x) and p 1 (x), and is a measure of their distinguishability.
Suppose we are given a state (density matrix) ρ. The most general measurement giving a result x in some set X of possible outputs is given by a POVM [15] E indexed by X , i.e. a family E = (E x ) x∈X of Hermitian operators E x with non-negative eigenvalues such that x∈X E x = I. The probability of occurrence of x given the state ρ is then equal to
Given two equally likely states ρ 0 and ρ 1 , and a measurement procedure E, let p
be the resulting two probability distributions, and let
the Shannon Distinguishability between the density matrices once a particular POVM is used. The maximum information we can get regarding the state we are facing is given by the optimal Shannon Distinguishability (known also as the accessible information)
where the supremum is taken over all POVMs on all possible sets X .
Unfortunately, there is no known analytic formula giving such optimal mutual information. In what follows, we present two important bounds; the proofs are given in the Appendix. 
The ρ b is called a lift-up of ρ p , and is known as purification if it is a pure state. This theorem (proven independently in [16] ) actually states that tracing-out cannot increase information. It provides a useful upper bound on the mutual information that can be obtained about mixed states ρ i , if we can find appropriate states ρ i . A similar idea which says that mixing cannot increase information was used in [10] to obtain a more limited security result.
For a Hermitian matrix A, the Trace-Norm of A, denoted by Tr |A|, is the sum of the absolute values of the eigenvalues of A. The following upper bound is very important. THEOREM 2 [17] . For any two density matrices ρ 0 and ρ 1 , defined on some space H,
The importance of this bound is in avoiding the necessity of optimizing over all possible measurements (since the Trace-Norm is independent of the measurement process), an optimization process which is in general unknown. The optimal measurement (as far as mutual information is concerned) still yields optimal mutual information which is bounded by the expression of the Trace-Norm.
Error versus Information.
We assume that Eve is powerful enough to control the natural noise. Without loss of generality, we assume that Eve's probes are in some arbitrary but fixed initial (tensor product) pure state, and that each probe is in a state |E . In the collective attack, the state |E ⊗ |b is subjected to Eve's unitary transformation U that changes the state |b sent by Alice to the final global state
where the |E z i, j are Eve's non-normalized states. Implicitly, this description corresponds to restricting natural noise to follow the spirit of the collective attacks. It is reasonable to suspect that more general noise models would not be to Eve's advantage, but being unable to prove it, we adopted the above restriction.
Bob's average error probability in the z basis (measuring
. Alice can also use the alternate basis x, and then the transformation U can also be expressed in the x basis (replacing everywhere z by x) to yield Bob's average probability of error in the x basis:
For any choice of attack we now show a connection between the error rate induced if Alice and Bob used the x basis, and Eve's benefit from the attack if the z basis was used. This is an "information versus disturbance" argument. Due to linearity of the transformation U we obtain |E 1/2 . Alice uses both bases with the same probability, hence Bob's overall probability of error is p e =
1/2 and sin(α x ) ≤ (2 p e ) 1/2 . When Eve performs an attack on a particular qubit the purifications in both bases are restricted as above. In what follows we simply drop the indices x and z, taking as a convention that we are dealing with the actual basis that Alice and Bob agreed upon (and which become known to Eve only after she retransmitted the particle towards Bob). Thus, for any qubit |b x or |b z transmitted from Alice to Bob, we have found that the connection between Eve's angle (in the basis actually chosen by Alice and Bob) and Bob's average error-rate is
Also we have found that the purification of Eve's state (known to her only once she learns the basis) is
The State in
Eve's Hands. We now look at the n remaining qubits after Alice and Bob discard those bits where the bases did not agree. Some bits are used to verify that p test ≤ p allowed , to be left with n-bit string x. After retransmitting the ith bit (denoted here by x i ) to Bob, Eve's state is ρ x i (E), where x i is either 0 or 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) according to the bit which Alice sent to Bob. (Note that x i replaces b of the previous section; b is not used in this section, and shall have a different meaning in later sections.) The purification of Eve's state is |x i = cos(α i )|0 i + (−1) x i sin(α i )|1 i , where {|0 i ; |1 i } replaces {|0 H i ; |1 H i } of
the notations of the previous paragraph and in the appropriate basis. Moreover, sin(α i ) ≤ (2 p i )
1/2 , where p i is Bob's probability of error on the ith bit (averaged over the four possible input states), which is completely determined by Eve's transformation. Thanks to the properties of the trace, the global state of Eve's probes, ρ x (E), is obtained by performing a partial trace of | x , the tensor product of the | x i .
To expand | x we first need some notations. Boldface letters like j, x are used to denote strings in {0, 1} n that are interpreted as n-vectors on the binary field. The ith bit in j is denoted j i (j i stands for a different n-bit vector and not for the ith bit of j). Boldface letters are also used in kets, with the following meaning: if j = j 1 · · · j n is concatenation of n bits, then |j = | j 1 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ | j n n where |0 i and |1 i are the basis vectors of the purifications of Eve's ith qubit. The state
can be written as
where Let j ⊕ k be the bitwise XOR of the strings j and k. Using the equality (−1) x·j (−1)
, the density matrix corresponding to the lift-up (here purification) | x x | of Eve's state can be written
for any string x sent by Alice.
Letx be the number of ones in x, called the Hamming weight of x. Then x ⊕ j is the Hamming distance between x and j.
6. The Parity Bit. In order to encode one key-bit b (0 or 1) using a substring of the n bits she sent, Alice proceeds as follows: she chooses some string w ∈ {0, 1} n to define the relevant bits in x whose exclusive-OR forms the final 1-bit secret key (in other words, the ones in the string w define the substring of x which will be used for privacy amplification); Alice announces w to Bob; Bob understands that the key-bit sent is b = x · w, and can calculate the final bit b. Eve now knows w (but not x) and has to guess b = x · w. Only strings x such that x · w = b contribute to ρ w b , and all these strings are equiprobable, hence
The following theorem applies to the states given by (20), (19) , and deals with the quality of the privacy amplification. If we look at w as the characteristic function of a set also denoted w, one can write i ∈ w instead of w i = 1 (that is, "set notations"), and thus Theorem 3 gives
so that finally
if the error correction data is unknown to Eve.
The special case where w = 11 · · · 1 and all angles are the same (α) was solved to leading order in [8] using different methods giving (2α) n / √ π n/2. Using our method for that case, we get (sin 2α) n as a bound. where V is the transpose of V. The matrix V defines a linear code C with 2 n−r code words of length n, namely the linear space defined by yV = 0, and spanned by all these strings y. If its minimal distance (the smallest Hamming weight of a nonzero code word) is d = 2t + 1, then the code can be used to correct up to t errors. The same holds for other sets of strings x provided we are given the "syndrome" b = xV ; the set of strings x (for a particular nonzero syndrome) then forms a nonlinear code defined by the same matrix V, with the same minimal distance as the linear code C. That is, the new code consists of the coset of C which maps to b (it is an affine code instead of a linear code).
The strings v 1 , . . . , v r can be chosen randomly, to yield a random linear code, or can be chosen according to some other procedure. The results we obtain are independent of the way the code is generated.
Let V be the linear space spanned by {v 1 , . . . , v r }. Since the strings v i are assumed to be linearly independent, the space V is of dimension 2 r over the field
Clearly, the map s → v s is linear and injective (from linear independence); as a result, it is an isomorphism (i.e. 1-1 and onto) from F r 2 onto V. Moreover, for any x that is a solution of the system E of equations (i.e. such that xV = b), we get
The notation v s will be used extensively in what follows. Notice that for any v ∈ V Eve is able to find s such that v s = v and, as a result, knows the parity s · b of the substring of x determined by v.
The privacy amplification string w must also be linearly independent from the set of the error correction strings, i.e. w / ∈ V. We shall show that the Hamming distances between the privacy amplification string and each string in the linear space V spanned by the error correction strings {v 1 · · · v r }, will provide the security parameters of the final key.
Recall that Eve holds a state for which the pure state of (19) is a purification, but she does not know x. Eve learns the set of linear constraints which are imposed on the bits of x. More precisely, the additional data provides the system E = {v 
an equal mixture of the states | x x | such that x is a "code word," and the secret parity bit is b.
Note that the first result generalizes (21), and the second result generalizes (22), to contain the error correction data.
Using (24) and the set notation of (25) we finally get
Therefore, we can use Theorems 1 and 2 to get
when the error correction data is known to Eve. For each s ∈ {0, 1} r , letn s = w ⊕ v s be the Hamming distance between w and v s . Since n s is the number of elements in the set of indices corresponding to w ⊕ v s , it is also the number of factors in the product i∈(w ⊕ v s ) . Also let
A Bound on
be the arithmetic mean (average) of the probabilities p i for i ∈ w ⊕ v s . The geometrical mean of the elements 8 p i such that i ∈ w ⊕ v s is bounded above by the arithmetic mean of the same elements, i.e. [ i∈(w ⊕ v s ) ( Given that the test is passed, p test ≤ p allowed , statistical analysis promises us that each of the p s is bounded; indeed, combining two laws of large numbers of Hoeffding [18] , Theorem 2 in [18] (sums of independent random variables) and its extension in Section 6 in [18] (sampling from a finite population), we are promised that p n , the average p i of all n relevant bits (n = n + n test ), satisfies Prob[ p n > p test + 2δ] ≤ 2e −2n test δ 2 (since the tested bits are picked at random). Moreover, p s ≤ (n /n s ) p n . As a result we get, for all s ∈ {0, 1} r ,
except with probability p luck ≤ 2e −2n test δ 2 . Therefore, Eve's information is generously bounded by
except with a probability of p luck = 2e −2n test δ Now, letn = min sns and let n be even (throw one bit away if needed (before choosing the bits for the test)), and choose n = n test = n /2. Moreover, let δ = p test /2 (those choices are clearly not intended to be optimal). Then
except with a probability of 2e −n p test 2 /2 . Therefore, Eve's information is bounded by
except with a probability of p luck = 2e −n p test 1 32 < 1.5625%, sincen must be less than n/2). Equation (34) still holds if we replacen s by the smaller valuen. We finally get
except with a probability of 2e −n p test 2 /2 . Again, for sufficiently small error rates, there are error correcting codes which allow us to choose the parameters n, r , andn such that Eve's information is exponentially small. This completes what we want to say about the security of a single bit final key.
We do not calculate the error-rate threshold here, but such a threshold was calculated in the proof of security against the most general attacks possible [1] . Due to various nonoptimal steps in the current paper, the threshold which can be obtained here is much worse than the one obtained in [1] (which is 7.56) for more general attacks, hence calculating the threshold for the current proof is meaningless. To obtain a security parametern, Alice and Bob must make sure that each string in W − {0} has a Hamming distance of at leastn from any string in V, the linear space spanned by {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v r }. Furthermore, if Alice and Bob want Eve to be ignorant of linear combinations of the different key bits, they should be more strict, and make sure that any string in the space W − {0} has at least a Hamming distancen from any other string in the space V + W.
Then the final formula (39) is modified by replacing 2 r by 2 r +m−1 , and the Hamming distancen is modified to be the minimal distance between any two vectors in the space V + W (of dimension r + m over F 2 ).
Since E is arbitrary, we choose the one which optimizes Shannon Distinguishability and this concludes the proof. PROOF OF THEOREM 3. For convenience we define
x·w and for the states given by (20), (19) , we get
We now simplify the preceding sum using a technique similar to the one of [9] . If j ⊕ k ⊕ w = 0, there is some string y such that (j ⊕ k ⊕ w) · y = 1. If we let x = x ⊕ y, then ( ).
As in the proof of Theorem 3, we define w ⊕ v s for the terms in the parenthesis. We obtain E,w = s∈{0,1} r (−1) s·b ( w ⊕ v s ), and due to the triangle inequality,
The Trace-Norm of these terms is given by (22) once w there is replaced by w ⊕ v s . Now, using the set notation we finally get 
